

Systemic risk with jump diffusion processes

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UCSB

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- Systemic risk with jump diffusion processes
- Maximum principle of jump diffusion processes
- Systemic risk with a game feature

- Flocking.

S. Ha, K. Lee and D. Lévy. Emergence of time-asymptotic flocking in a stochastic Cucker-Smale system. Commun. Math. Sci. Vol.7, No.2, 453-469, (2009).

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- Systemic risk.

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Stochastic Cucker-Smale system (SCS)

Let $(x_t^{(i)}, v_t^{(i)}) \in R^2$ be the position and velocity of particles for $i = 1, \dots, N$ with the initial data $(x_0^{(i)}, v_0^{(i)})$.

$$dx_t^{(i)} = v_t^{(i)} dt,$$

$$dv_t^{(i)} = \frac{\alpha}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \psi(x_t^{(j)}, x_t^{(i)}) (v_t^{(j)} - v_t^{(i)}) dt + dL_t^{(i)}, 1 \leq i \leq N,$$

where the noise term $L_t^{(i)}$ is a Lévy process on R generated by (a, σ, ν) . We show that the SCS model driven by Lévy processes will satisfy the following criteria, for $1 \leq i, j \leq N$,

$$(\text{velocity alignment}) \quad \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \left| \mathbb{E}(v_t^{(i)}) - \mathbb{E}(v_t^{(j)}) \right| = 0,$$

$$(\text{group formation}) \quad \sup_{0 \leq t < \infty} \left| \mathbb{E}(x_t^{(i)}) - \mathbb{E}(x_t^{(j)}) \right| < \infty.$$

- Systemic risk with jump diffusion processes

- Systemic risk for jump diffusion processes with double-exponential jump size

We consider the log-monetary reserves of N banks possibly lending and borrowing to each other.

The model is

$$dX_t^i = \frac{a}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \left(X_t^j - X_t^i \right) dt + dL_t^i, \quad 1 \leq i \leq N,$$


where $L_t^i = \sigma W_t^i + \sum_{j=1}^{N_t^i} \xi_j$, ξ_j has distribution $f(y; \theta) = \frac{\theta}{2} e^{-|y|^\theta}$, $\theta > 0$ and N_t^i is a Poisson process with rate λ .

- Log-monetary reserves of bank i

- Borrowing from the bank j if $X_t^j > X_t^i$
- Lending to the bank j if $X_t^j < X_t^i$
- rate of borrowing/lending

$$\begin{aligned} dX_t^i &= \frac{a}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N (X_t^j - X_t^i) dt + dL_t^i \\ &= a (\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) dt + dL_t^i. \end{aligned}$$

- $a > 0$: borrowing if $\bar{X}_t > X_t^i$, lending if $\bar{X}_t < X_t^i$




We now investigate how many banks have reached the default level $D < 0$ before $t = 1$.

Define $\{\text{default event}\} = \{\min_{0 \leq t \leq 1} X_t^i \leq D, 1 \leq i \leq N\}$ and $K \equiv \{\# \text{ of default}\}$.

We are now interested in the loss distribution


$$p = \mathbb{P}(K = k), k = 0, 1, \dots, N.$$

Simulations for **small** rate of borrowing/lending




$a = 1, N = 10, D = -0.7, \sigma = 1$ and $t = 1$.

Simulations for **large** rate of borrowing/lending



$a = 100, N = 10, D = -0.7, \sigma = 1$ and $t = 1$.

large rate of borrowing/lending with jumps



$a = 100, N = 10, D = -0.7, \sigma = 1, \theta = 1, \lambda = 1$ and $t = 1$.

First passage time for the ensemble average

Systemic event :

$$\left\{ \min_{0 \leq t \leq T} \bar{X}_t \leq D \right\}$$

We now focus on the event where the ensemble average $\bar{X}_t = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N L_t^i$ reaches the default level $D < 0$.

If $L_t^i = \sigma W_t^i$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P} \left(\min_{0 \leq t \leq T} \bar{X}_t \leq D \right) &= \mathbb{P} \left(\min_{0 \leq t \leq T} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N W_t^i \leq D \right) \\ &= \mathbb{P} \left(\min_{0 \leq t \leq T} \tilde{W}_t \leq \frac{D\sqrt{N}}{\sigma} \right) \\ &= 2\Phi \left(\frac{D\sqrt{N}}{\sigma T} \right), \end{aligned}$$

where \tilde{W}_t is a standard Brownian motion.

First passage time for the ensemble average

If $L_t^i = \sigma W_t^i + \sum_{j=1}^{N_t^i} \zeta_j$ and ζ_i has distribution $f(y; \theta) = \frac{\theta}{2} e^{-|y|^\theta}$, $\theta > 0$, then $\mathbb{P} \left(\min_{0 \leq t \leq T} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N L_t^i \leq D \right)$ can be evaluated by inversion Laplace transform.

The moment generating function of L_t is given by

$$\mathbb{E} \left[e^{z L_t} \right] = \exp \{ G(z) t \},$$

where $G(x) \equiv \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 x^2 + \lambda \left(\frac{\theta^2}{\theta^2 - x^2} - 1 \right)$.

Let $\tau_D = \inf \{ t \geq 0; L_t \leq D \}$, where $D < 0$.

Theorem (S. Kou and H. Wang, 2003)

For any $s \in (0, \infty)$. Let β_1 and β_2 be the only two positive roots of the equation

$$s = G(\beta),$$

where $0 < \beta_1 < \theta < \beta_2 < \infty$. Then the Laplace transform of τ_D is given by

$$\mathbb{E} [e^{-s\tau_D}] = \frac{\theta - \beta_1}{\theta} \frac{\beta_2}{\beta_2 - \beta_1} e^{D\beta_1} + \frac{\beta_2 - \theta}{\theta} \frac{\beta_1}{\beta_2 - \beta_1} e^{D\beta_2}.$$

By the numerical inversion, we can now compute the probability

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{P} \left(\min_{0 \leq t \leq T} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N L_t^i \leq D \right) \\ &= \mathbb{P} \left(\min_{0 \leq t \leq T} \left(\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{N}} \tilde{W}_t + \sum_{j=1}^{\tilde{N}_t} \tilde{\xi}_j \right) \leq D \right), \end{aligned}$$

where \tilde{W}_t is a standard Brownian motion, \tilde{N}_t is a Poisson processes with rate $N\lambda$ and $\tilde{\xi}_j$ has distribution $f(y; \theta) = \frac{\theta/N}{2} e^{-|y|\theta/N}$, $\theta > 0$.

- Maximum principle of jump diffusion processes

Maximum principle for jump diffusion processes

- State process

$$\begin{aligned} dX_t = & \ b(t, X_t, \alpha_t) dt + \sigma(t, X_t, \alpha_t) dW_t \\ & + \int_R \gamma(t, X_{t-}, \alpha_{t-}, z) \tilde{N}(dt, dz), \end{aligned}$$

where $\tilde{N}(dt, dz) = N(dt, dz) - \nu(dz) dt$.

- The performance criterion

$$J(\alpha) = E \left[\int_0^T f(t, X_t, \alpha_t) dt + g(X_T) \right],$$

where $T < \infty$ is deterministic, f is continuous and g is concave.

- Consider the problem to find an admissible $\alpha^* \in A$ such that

$$J(\alpha^*) = \sup_{\alpha \in A} J(\alpha)$$

Define the Hamiltonian $H : [0, T] \times R \times U \times R \times R \times R \rightarrow R$ by

$$\begin{aligned} H(t, x, \alpha, p, q, r) = & f(t, x, \alpha) + b(t, x, \alpha) p + \sigma(t, x, \alpha) q \\ & + \int_R \gamma(t, x, \alpha, z) r(t, z) \nu(dz), \end{aligned}$$

where R is the set of functions $r : [0, T] \times R \rightarrow R$ such that the integrals converge. p, q and r satisfy the BSDE

$$\begin{aligned} dp_t &= -H_x(t, x, \alpha, p, q, r) dt + q dW_t + \int_R r(t^-, z) \tilde{N}(dt, dz), \\ p_T &= g'(X_T) \end{aligned}$$

A sufficient maximum principle

Theorem

Let $\alpha \in A$ with corresponding solution $X^ = X^{(\alpha^*)}$ and suppose there exists a solution $(p_t^*, q_t^*, r^*(t, z))$ of the corresponding adjoint equation. Moreover, suppose that*

$$H(t, X_t^*, \alpha_t^*, p_t^*, q_t^*, r^*(t, \cdot)) = \sup_{u \in U} H(t, X_t^*, \alpha, p_t^*, q_t^*, r^*(t, \cdot))$$

and

$$H(x) := \max_{\alpha \in U} H(t, x, \alpha, p_t^*, q_t^*, r^*(t, \cdot))$$

exists and is a concave function of x , for all $t \in [0, T]$.

Then α^ is a optimal control.*

Example : The stochastic linear regulator problem

Solve the stochastic control problem

$$J(x) = \inf_{\alpha} E^x \left[\int_0^T (X_t^2 + \theta \alpha_t^2) dt + \lambda X_T^2 \right],$$

where

$$dX_t = \alpha_t dt + \sigma dW_t + \int_R z \tilde{N}(dt, dz), \quad X_0 = x, \text{ and } T > 0 \text{ is a constant.}$$

We can solve this problem by using the stochastic maximum principle.

Define the Hamiltonian

$$H(t, x, \alpha, p, q, r) = x^2 + \theta \alpha^2 + \alpha p + \sigma q + \int_R zr(t^-, z) \nu(dz)$$

The adjoint equation is

$$\begin{aligned} dp_t &= -2X_t dt + q_t dW_t + \int_R r(t^-, z) \tilde{N}(dt, dz); \quad t < T \\ p_T &= 2\lambda X_T. \end{aligned}$$

By imposing the first and second-order conditions, we see that $H(t, x, \alpha, p, q, r)$ is minimal for

$$\alpha = \alpha_t = \hat{\alpha}_t = -\frac{1}{2\theta}p_t.$$

To find a solution of the adjoint equation, we consider the ansatz

$$p_t = h_t X_t,$$

where $h_t : R \rightarrow R$ is a deterministic function such that $h_T = 2\lambda$. Note that $\alpha_t = -\frac{h_t X_t}{2\theta}$ and

$$dX_t = -\frac{h_t X_t}{2\theta} dt + \sigma dW_t + \int_R z \tilde{N}(dt, dz); \quad X_0 = x.$$

Moreover, differentiate the ansatz

$$\begin{aligned} dp_t &= h_t dX_t + h'_t X_t dt \\ &= \left[-\frac{h_t^2}{2\theta} + h'_t \right] X_t dt + h_t \sigma dW_t + h_t \int_R z \tilde{N}(dt, dz). \end{aligned}$$

Hence, h_t is the solution of

$$h'_t = \frac{h_t^2}{2\theta} - 2$$

and $h_T = 2\lambda$, $t < T$. The solution is then given by

$$h_t = 2\sqrt{\theta} \frac{1 + \beta e^{\frac{2t}{\sqrt{\theta}}}}{1 - \beta e^{\frac{2T}{\sqrt{\theta}}}},$$

where $\beta = \frac{\lambda - \sqrt{\theta}}{\lambda + \sqrt{\theta}} e^{-\frac{2T}{\sqrt{\theta}}}$. By using the stochastic maximum principle, we can conclude that

$$\alpha_t^* = -\frac{h_t X_t}{2\theta}$$

is the optimal control, $p_t = h_t X_t$ and $q_t = \sigma h_t$, $r(t^-, z) = h_t z$.

- Systemic risk with a game feature

Systemic risk with a game feature

- The dynamics with the central bank

$$dX_t^i = \alpha_t^i dt + dL_t^i, \quad (1)$$

where $dL_t^i = \sigma^i dW_t^i + \int_R \gamma^i(t^-, z) N^i(dt, dz)$, R is the set such that the integral converges, $W_t^i, i = 1, \dots, N$ are independent Brownian motions and $\int_R \gamma^i(t^-, z) N^i(dt, dz)$ are independent jump processes with Poisson random measure $N^i(dt, dz)$ and of jump size $\gamma^i(t^-, z)$.

- Rewrite (1) as

$$dX_t^i = [\alpha_t^i dt + v_t^i] dt + d\tilde{L}_t^i,$$

where $v_t^i = \int_R \gamma^i(t^-, z) v^i(dz)$ and now $d\tilde{L}_t^i = \sigma^i dW_t^i + \int_R \gamma^i(t^-, z) \tilde{N}^i(dt, dz)$, $i = 1, \dots, N$ are independent martingales. $\tilde{N}^i(dt, dz) = N^i(dt, dz) - v^i(dz) dt$, for $i = 1, \dots, N$ are compensated Poisson random measures.

Control problem

Bank $i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$ controls its rate of lending and borrowing (to a central bank) at time t by choosing the control α_t^i in order to minimize

$$J^i(\alpha^i, \dots, \alpha^N) = E \left\{ \int_0^T f_i(X_t, \alpha_t^i) dt + g_i(X_T^i) \right\}$$

with

$$\begin{aligned} f_i(x, \alpha^i) &= \frac{1}{2} (\alpha^i)^2 - q\alpha^i (\bar{x} - x^i) + \frac{\epsilon}{2} (\bar{x} - x^i)^2, \\ g_i(x) &= \frac{c}{2} (\bar{x} - x^i)^2, \end{aligned}$$

where $f_i(x, \alpha)$ is convex in (x, α) under the assumption $q^2 \leq \epsilon$.

$\alpha = \alpha(t, x)$, feedback strategies

- Using the Pontryagin approach, the Hamiltonian for bank i is given by

$$\begin{aligned} & H^i \left(x, y^{i,1}, \dots, y^{i,N}, \alpha^1(t, x), \dots, \alpha_t^i, \dots, \alpha^N(t, x) \right) \\ &= \sum_{k \neq i} \left[a(\bar{x} - x^k) + \alpha^k(t, x) \right] y^{i,k} \\ & \quad + \left[a(\bar{x} - x^i) + \alpha^i \right] y^{i,i} \\ & \quad + \frac{1}{2} (\alpha^i)^2 - q \alpha^i (\bar{x} - x^i) + \frac{\epsilon}{2} (\bar{x} - x^i)^2 \end{aligned}$$

Minimizing H^i over α^i gives the choices :

$$\hat{\alpha}^i = -y^{i,i} + q(\bar{x} - x^i), \quad i = 1, \dots, N, \quad (2)$$

and we make the ansatz

$$Y_t^{i,j} = \left(\frac{1}{N} - \delta_{i,j} \right) [\eta_t (\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) + \varphi_t^i],$$

where η_t and φ_t^i are deterministic functions satisfying the terminal condition $\eta_T = c$ and $\varphi_T^i = 0$. With the choices (2) we get

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha^k &= \left[q + \eta_t \left(1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \right] (\bar{x} - x^k) + \left(1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \varphi_t^k, \\ \partial_{x^j} \alpha^k &= \left[q + \eta_t \left(1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \right] \left(\frac{1}{N} - \delta_{k,j} \right). \end{aligned}$$

The forward equation is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 dX_t^i &= \partial y^{i,i} H^i (X_t, Y_t^i, \alpha_t) dt + dL_t^i \\
 &= \alpha_t^i dt + dL_t^i \\
 &= \left\{ \left[q + \eta_t \left(1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \right] (\bar{x} - x^k) + \left(1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \varphi_t^k \right\} dt + dL_t^i.
 \end{aligned}$$

The adjoint backward equation is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 dY_t^{i,j} &= -\partial x^j H^i dt + \sum_{k=1}^N Z_t^{i,j,k} dW_t^k + \sum_{k=1}^N \int_R r^{i,j,k} (t^-, z) \tilde{N}^k (dt, dz) \\
 &= \left(\frac{1}{N} - \delta_{i,j} \right) (\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) [q\eta_t + q^2 - \epsilon] dt \\
 &\quad + \left(\frac{1}{N} - \delta_{i,j} \right) (a + q) \varphi_t^i dt \\
 &\quad + \sum_{k=1}^N Z_t^{i,j,k} dW_t^k + \sum_{k=1}^N \int_R r^{i,j,k} (t^-, z) \tilde{N}^k (dt, dz).
 \end{aligned}$$

Using Ito's formula to differentiate the ansatz to obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
 dY_t^{i,j} &= d \left\{ \left(\frac{1}{N} - \delta_{i,j} \right) [\eta_t (\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) + \phi_t^i] \right\} \\
 &= \left(\frac{1}{N} - \delta_{i,j} \right) [\dot{\eta}_t (\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) dt + \eta_t d(\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) + \dot{\phi}_t^i dt] \\
 &= \left(\frac{1}{N} - \delta_{i,j} \right) (\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) \left[\dot{\eta}_t - \eta_t \left(q + \left(1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \eta_t \right) \right] dt \\
 &\quad + \left(\frac{1}{N} - \delta_{i,j} \right) \left[\dot{\phi}_t^i + \eta_t \left(1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) (\bar{\varphi}_t - \phi_t^i) + \eta_t (\bar{v}_t - v_t^i) \right] dt \\
 &\quad + \eta_t \left(\frac{1}{N} - \delta_{i,j} \right) \left(\frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N d\tilde{L}_t^k - d\tilde{L}_t^i \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

After some careful calculation, η_t must satisfy the scalar Riccati equation

$$\dot{\eta}_t = 2q\eta_t + \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \eta_t^2 - (\epsilon - q^2),$$

with the terminal condition $\eta_T = c$, and ϕ_t^i must satisfy the equation

$$\dot{\phi}_t^i = \left[q + \eta_t \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \right] \phi_t^i - \eta_t (\bar{v}_t - v_t^i), i = 1, \dots, N,$$

with terminal condition $\phi_T^i = 0$. Furthermore, we will also have $\bar{\varphi}_t = 0$. The optimal strategies are then given by


$$\alpha_t^i = \left[q + \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \eta_t \right] (\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) + \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \phi_t^i, i = 1, \dots, N.$$

Nash equilibrium

The dynamics with optimal strategies

$$\begin{aligned}dX_t^i &= \alpha_t^i dt + dL_t^i \\&= \left[q + \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \eta_t \right] (\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) dt + \left[\left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \varphi_t^i \right] dt + dL_t^i\end{aligned}$$

Under the Nash equilibrium, the system is operating as if banks were borrowing from and lending to each other at the rate $A_t \equiv q + \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \eta_t$ and the linear growth $B_t^i = \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \varphi_t^i$ contributed by the jumps. The net effect is liquidity and the central bank acts as a **clearing house**.



Systemic risk

The dynamics with optimal strategies are

$$dX_t^i = A_t (\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) dt + B_t^i dt + dL_t^i.$$

The ensemble average is

$$d\bar{X}_t = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N dL_t^i$$

The systemic risk probability stays the same even in the control problem with jumps!

$$\mathbb{P} \left(\min_{0 \leq t \leq T} \bar{X}_t \leq D \right) = \mathbb{P} \left(\min_{0 \leq t \leq T} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N L_t^i \leq D \right)$$

Example (Compound Poisson processes with distinct jump rates)

Let $L_t^i = \sigma W_t^i + \sum_{j=1}^{N_t^i} \xi_j$, ξ_j has distribution $f(y; \theta) = \frac{\theta}{2} e^{-|y-\mu|^\theta}$, $\theta > 0$ and N_t^i is a Poisson process with rate λ^i . Then, for $i=1, \dots, N$, $v_t^i = \lambda^i E(\xi_j) = \lambda^i \mu$. Assuming that $\bar{v}_t = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \lambda^i \mu = 0$. Then, under the Nash equilibrium, the dynamics now become


$$dX_t^i = \left[q + \left(1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \eta_t \right] (\bar{X}_t - X_t^i) dt + \left(1 - \frac{1}{N} \right) \varphi_t^i dt + dL_t^i,$$

where η_t and φ_t^i must satisfy the following equations


$$\begin{aligned} \dot{\eta}_t &= 2q\eta_t + \left(1 - \frac{1}{N^2} \right) \eta_t^2 - (\epsilon - q^2) \\ \dot{\varphi}_t^i &= \left[q + \eta_t \left(1 - \frac{1}{N^2} \right) \right] \varphi_t^i + \eta_t \lambda^i \mu, i = 1, \dots, N, \end{aligned}$$

with the terminal condition $\eta_T = c$ and $\varphi_T^i = 0$.

Plots of additional liquidity and linear growth





$q = 1, \epsilon = 10, v_t^i = 1, N = 10$ and
 $T = 1.$





$q = 1, \epsilon = 10, v_t^i = 1, N = 10$ and
 $T = 10.$

Nash equilibrium illustrated



$v_t^i = -1, N = 10$ and $T = 1$.



$v_t^i = -1, N = 10$ and $T = 10$.

Conclusion

- 1 The systemic risk is higher when we add jumps in our model.
- 2 When coming a game feature with jumps, the effect is the additional liquidity and linear growth contributed by jumps. The central bank acts as a clearing house.

Future works

- 1 Consider to generalize the rate of borrowing/lending as a function of \bar{X}_t . i.e. $a = a(\bar{X}_t)$.
- 2 Major player and minor players.
- 3 Consider the dynamics of monetary reserve instead of log-monetary reserve.

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Thank you!